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Abstract 
 There is currently going on in our institutions of higher learning a 
worrisome conflation of the philosophy of science with some other areas of 
research especially the history of science, the sociology of science and 
science education. There are a number of reasons for this anomaly.  The 
most pathetic is the conflation done because of lucre: the sordid material or 
pecuniary gain to be made from doing so. Sometimes the conflation arises 
from the confusion of a task of the philosophy of science to foster the unity 
of the sciences. Practitioners of such other sciences often tend to conflate the 
philosophy of science and the science. Sometimes the conflation arises from 
confusing the philosophy of science with its essential tool, the history of 
science. Historians of science often conflate philosophy of science and 
history of science. I suspect, however, that the more serious reason for most 
of the conflations is ignorance of the philosophy of science as a discipline on 
its own right. Whatever the reason for the conflation, this paper as the theme 
states, has the objective to delineate the scope and boundary of the 
philosophy of science and this implies establishing the objects, methodology 
and definition of the philosophy of science. This paper fills the need to 
present the philosophy of science as a distinct discipline, standing on its own 
rights, which does not need to be fused with any other discipline.  
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Introduction 
Introductions are not easy. One of the fathers of analytic philosophy, 
G. E. Moore (1873 - 1958) was once asked, “What is philosophy?” He 
pointed at his bookshelf and said: “That is philosophy” (Flew, 1979, p.3). 
This ostensive introduction was Moore’s subtle way of 
acknowledging the difficulty involved in introducing a discipline. Be that as 
it may, there are two major approaches, both suggested in Moore’s cryptic 
answer, to introduce a discipline. They are the historical approach and the 
European Scientific Journal March  2015 edition vol.11, No.8 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
131 
analytic approach. The historical approach involves a chronological 
presentation of the literature on the historical development of the discipline 
with the aim to glean what the discipline is all about. This approach is 
laborious considering the amount of literature to cover. The analytic 
approach involves the analysis of the objects (material and formal), the 
method(s), the purpose, and aims of the discipline. It is called analytic 
approach because to clarify, it resolves the discipline into its constituent 
elements bringing out the subject or material object, the formal object, and 
the methodology. The analytic approach is what we intend to apply in this 
paper to delineate the scope and boundary of the philosophy of science as a 
discipline in its own right.  
 
Subject-Matter of the Philosophy of Science 
Each science studies a particular being or an aspect of reality. 
Philosophy differs from the sciences in that it studies all reality: physical, 
spiritual, logical or virtual. Philosophy tries to give intelligibility to the 
multidimensional facets of reality. Philosophy, so to say, delegates her 
daughters to tackle every kind of problem that confronts man. Philosophy of 
nature for as long as it lasted, for instance, studied the natural world. When 
modern science was born in the 17th century and in the 18th and 19th centuries 
became successful and triumphant in gaining positive knowledge of the 
natural world and in having immense practical gain to show for this, new 
challenges and problems and consequently new role was created for 
philosophy. The point being made is that when science usurped from 
philosophy of nature the study of natural world, philosophy was left with 
nothing but science and its challenges and problems as its object of study. 
Philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy or the new 
discipline that emerged to play this role and take on these challenges and 
problems. It follows, according to the Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2000), that the subject-matter of the philosophy of science is 
science: the scientific enterprise, scientific theories, experimental and 
observational reports of scientists. The scientists are usually busy with 
scientific research: the collection of data, the collation of data, formulation of 
hypotheses, the construction of theories and the discovery of natural laws. 
The philosopher of science has the task of explaining and making 
sense of what the scientists do.  
 
Formal Object of the Philosophy of Science 
The formal object is the perspective or the point of view from which 
a discipline approaches its material object. For instance, psychology and 
anthropology are two distinct disciplines. Both of them have man as their 
material-object but while psychology has the mind or the psych as its 
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approach (format-object); anthropology has man’s artifacts as its approach 
(formal object). Two disciplines may have exactly the same material object 
but no two disciplines have exactly the same formal-object. It is the formal 
object of a discipline that makes it unique and differentiates it from another 
discipline. This is the import of the Latin saying, Scientia non duplicanda est 
– sciences are not duplicated arbitrarily. A new science is born directly a new 
approach to being is discovered. In like manner, sciences are not fused 
together arbitrarily.  
We can disclose the formal-object of the philosophy of science by 
contrasting the sorts of questions it raises about science with other questions. 
 In doing this, the formal-object of the philosophy of science will be 
displayed. Curd, Cover, and Pincock (2013) testify that “contrasting different 
sorts of questions can bring out the difference between the philosophy of 
science and other disciplines that study science” (p.xvii). They illustrate with 
the following questions: “When was the planet Neptune discovered?” “Why 
did Soviet biologists under Stalin reject Mendelian genetics?” “Why did 
James Watson underrate the contributions of Rosalind Franklin to the work 
that led to the discovery of the double helix structure of DNA?” These are 
respectively questions within the domain of history, sociology or political 
science, and psychology. Now contrast those questions with the following: 
“What is science?” “What is a law of nature?” “When is a theory 
confirmed?” These other set of questions is essentially fundamental and 
general and philosophical. They are not fact-finding questions. They cannot 
be answered by digging past happenings or by what people believe now. 
They cannot be answered by doing more science. They are fundamental, 
general, and philosophical questions about science. They are philosophy of 
science questions.  
Just as there are many aspects of the scientific enterprise, there is a 
miscellany of such philosophy of science questions. Attempting these 
questions but more importantly raising them show the approach of the 
philosophy of science but over and above clarifies the scientific enterprise. 
Let us outline samples of these questions to show the formal-object and the 
unique approach of the philosophy of science.  
Some of these questions of the philosophy science relate to the nature 
of science. Examples: What is science? How does science differ from non-
science and pseudo-science? What are the criteria of demarcation of science 
from non-science and pseudo-science? What is the aim(s) of science? What 
are the goals of science?  
It is also among the central concerns of the philosophy of science to 
raise questions about the epistemology of science, the theory of scientific 
knowledge, the cognitive aspect of scientific knowledge. Is set of questions 
relates to the investigation of the nature, genesis and sources of scientific 
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knowledge. How do scientists come by the theories they propound? Do the 
scientists come by their theories by educing hypotheses from the data of 
individual observations or by conjecture, supposition, inspiration, guess, 
hunch or dream?  Is there a direct logical path from observation experiences 
to hypotheses? Or do scientists deduce their theories?  
Some philosophy of science questions are about the nature of the 
relationship between scientific theories and the realities they talk about. This 
is the problem of the nature of the representative status of scientific theories. 
What is a scientific theory and how do scientific theories relate or represent 
the world? Should scientific theories be best understood as the logical 
empiricists do (as axiomatized sentences connected to their observational 
bases by correspondence), or as semantic theorists do (as models)?   
Some philosophy of science questions relate to the evidence upon 
which scientific theories are based. These are issues relating to the secure 
base of science in observation and experiment. In this regard, philosophy of 
science asks such questions as, how are scientific theories to be accredited? 
Is it simplicity, explanatory power, pragmatism, or probability that accredits 
scientific theories? When a scientific theory is said to be accredited, what 
does that tell us about the theory, and the entities postulated by it? Are 
theoretical entities real even though unobservable?  
Some philosophy of science questions are about the methodology of 
science. Such questions as, what is the method(s) by which science arrives at 
its posited truths about the world? Is there a logic of scientific conclusion, 
discovery and justification? Both the rationalist and non-rationalist 
philosophers of science agree with Nagel (1961) that it is the task, a major if 
not the exclusive task, of the philosophy of science to carefully analyse the 
procedure by which scientific conclusions are established.  
There are also, philosophy of science questions related to the 
metaphysics of science, scientific concepts and values. Curd and Psillos 
(2008) put all philosophy of science questions into four groups: those related 
to the nature of science; those related to scientific theories and their relation 
to the world; those related to the nature of scientific concepts; and those 
related to the nature of theory-change or theory-choice and the place of 
values in science. What is to be noted about these questions is that they are 
philosophical in nature. They are questions that, though they are about 
science, can only be answered by philosophy and not by science. This 
indicates that the perspective of the philosophy of science to the study of 
science is philosophical.  
 
The Method of the Philosophy of Science 
In plain language, method is a set way of doing something, a 
procedure of getting a task done. In the epistemic community, method is the 
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process by which knowledge is produced. Boyd, Gasper and Trout (1991) 
define methodology as “The procedures and techniques governing inquiry, or 
the study of such procedures and techniques” (p.778). The question could 
then be asked, is there a method of the philosophy of science? Yes, there is a 
process of generating knowledge in the philosophy of science. There is a 
method of the philosophy of science. This is the method of philosophical 
analyses. The philosophy of science uses the method of philosophical 
analysis because, foundational questions, the kind that philosophy of science 
raises are philosophical question that often require the special analytic 
techniques of philosophical analyses for their resolution. 
It should not be understood that philosophy of science has just one 
method. One method would prove inadequate to investigate the different 
ramifications of the scientific enterprise. The philosophy of science requires 
a great variety of procedures and philosophical analyses sometimes also 
called conceptual analysis takes a variety of forms. In one form, it is the 
procedure of clarifying or explaining a concept, belief, theory, question or 
even an answer by drawing attention to its constituents, presuppositions and 
implications. In a more narrow form; it is conceived as reductive analysis: a 
procedure in which the elements of a concept, belief or theory can be 
reduced to the elements of some other more basic concept, belief or theory. 
In yet another form, philosophical analyses means to provide the necessary 
and sufficient conditions that define a term. For instance, the term bachelor 
is analysed as an adult unmarried male. Being an adult and being a male are 
the necessary conditions for being a bachelor. The two necessary conditions 
added together give the sufficient condition for being a bachelor. In general, 
philosophical analyses are used to unload loaded statements; to unpack extra 
baggage, so to say; to render precise imprecision; and this is the central task 
of the philosophy of science.  
Since the twenty-first century when philosophy of science emerged 
as a sub-discipline of philosophy and professional area of research, logic and 
history of science, have both together come to become necessary tools for 
doing and understanding philosophy of science. But this was not always the 
case and needs explanations.  
Logic is taken as the language and tool of the philosophy of science. 
This view is plainly expressed by Kyburg, (1968, p. vii): “One cannot 
understand physics without knowing calculus. The same is true of 
philosophy of science. The philosophy of science can be understood without 
knowing physics (though perhaps not without really understanding some 
science), but it cannot be understood without some logic.” The point Kyburg 
is making is that the knowledge of logic or familiarity with it or a disposition 
to understand it is a sine qua non for doing philosophy of science.  
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Among the central tasks of the philosophy of science are making 
intelligible the scientific enterprise, the precise definition of scientific 
concepts, the validation of the model of reasoning in science, and the 
accreditation of scientific knowledge. Logic, formal logic, is a necessary tool 
which facilitates doing these for as Batens (2014) says, logic determines the 
meaning of logical operators such as ‘and’, ‘not’, ‘if…then’, etc.; logic 
assists one to achieve mathematical precision; logic helps in categorizing and 
putting issues in proper perspective and logic makes easy the drawing out of 
consequences and implications. In doing these logic facilitates making 
intelligible the scientific enterprise by the philosophy of science.   
Some logicians, however, take exception to regarding classical logic 
as the true and standard logic. There are logicians who take as standard for 
specific purposes alternative logics such as intuitionist logic, dialectic logic, 
and interrogative logic. Classical logic has the shortcomings that it is 
essentially a deductive form of reasoning and it is also based on the 
presupposition that the world is consistent; that is, that there are no 
contradictions. But we know that there are other forms of reasoning such as 
induction, abduction and retroduction. We also know that in real life there 
are situations where contradictions co-exist or occasions we have to accept a 
statement and its negation. There are many logics suitable for different 
purposes. Logicians believe that the standard and “… true logic is a relevant 
one” (Batens, 2014, p. 60). 
The view that logic is a necessary language and tool of the 
philosophy of science derives from logical positivism also called logical 
empiricism or neopositivism.  Logical positivism was a predominant and 
influential approach in the philosophy of science, dominating the area for 
about thirty years. From its inception in the context of Moritz Schlick’s 
Vienna Circle, Logical empiricists regarded “… logic, formal logic… central 
for the philosophy of science” (Batens, 2014, p. 59). Their reason is based on 
the generally accepted distinction between the context of discovery and the 
context of justification. The context of discovery has to do with the 
subjective (historical and psychological) circumstances that cause the initial 
formulation of scientific hypothesis, theory or inquiry. The context of 
justification, on the other hand, has to do with the observed reality or 
observational consequences which cause the formulation of hypothesis, 
theory or inquiry. The logical empiricists entirely focused on the context of 
justification and in so doing failed to see that the context of discovery 
(subjective element) also impacts scientific progress. The logical empiricists 
saw objectivity as a characteristic of science and the scientific method as 
simply the application of rule to data. Thus they conceived the philosophy of 
science as the logic of science, and so as playing a normative function: the 
analysis of the logical-syntactic structure of the basic concepts of science. 
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This proved to be a severely restricted view of the philosophy of science and 
this was made evident by the criticisms of the historicists.   
History of science, not surprisingly, has also today come to be taken 
as a necessary tool for the philosophy of science. This is just becoming 
current in the philosophy of science circle and this is in spite of the fact, as 
Bird (2014) observes, that the history of science itself has a long history, 
achieving disciplinary status in the nineteenth century following the initial 
efforts of William Whewell and securing that status in the twentieth century 
by the efforts of George Sarton. Sarton is acclaimed as the father founder of 
the discipline of the history of science. The reason history of science is just 
achieving currency is due to the domineering influence of logical empiricism 
and its exclusive focus on the context of justification in scientific progress.  
Today in the twenty-first century, “historical” or “descriptive” 
philosophy of science, using the words of Bird (2014, p. 88) enjoys wide 
spread acceptance over “prescriptive” philosophy of science. Yet even 
among the historicists such as Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and P.K. 
Feyerabend, “the relationship between history of science and philosophy of 
science is a difficult one” (Bird, 2014, p. 85). While Kuhn holds that the 
relationship is “asymmetrical”, Lakatos thinks it is more “subtle”. By 
“asymmetrical” relationship Kuhn means that the philosophy of science 
needs history of science while history of science does not need philosophy of 
science. History of science could be a useful data for philosophy of science 
to ensure that the latter’s descriptions of science indeed match actual 
practice. The “subtle” relationship is explained in the locus classicus: 
“Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of 
science without philosophy of science is blind” (Lakatos, 1971, p. 91). 
 Lakatos appropriates Hegelian view that history has an underlying 
logic. There could be history, a mere chronology that fails to discover this 
underlying logic. A philosophical history should uncover this underlying 
logic in history. So what is needed in history, according to Lakatos, is not 
mere description but a reconstruction to unravel the rational (logic). To do 
this philosophy is needed. Hence the philosophy of science needs the history 
of science and vice versa. P.K. Feyerabend stands with Kuhn that even if 
philosophy of science is conceived as a normative enterprise, it should still 
need to be accredited by the history of science.  
We should not dwell further in the “difficult” relationship between 
philosophy of science and history of science. It is not our thrust here. Our 
business is to demonstrate, and I suppose we have so done, that history of 
science has come to be widely accepted as a tool for the philosophy of 
science. The two areas now so impact each other that Bird (2014) records 
that in the 1960s and 1970s there became prevalent the establishment of 
programs and departments of history and philosophy of science.  
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Philosophy of Science: A Definition 
Philosophers of science do not agree on a single definition of the 
philosophy of science. The reasons are not farfetched. In the first place, there 
is the convoluted nature of philosophy: philosophy has various conceptions. 
Secondly, science itself, even in its modern sense, does not admit of a single 
definition. Science is an analogous term legitimately used in diverse senses. 
Any definition of the philosophy of science presupposes a conception of 
philosophy and of science. Hence there are many conceptions of the 
philosophy of science. Thinkers in the Critique of Science Movement, a 
coalition of philosophers of science such as E. Mach, J.H. Poincare, E. 
Leroy, P. Duhem and H. Bergson, conceive the “philosophy of science as a 
work of criticism.” They are of the opinion that the philosophy of science 
should be able to expose the limitations of science. Some of these thinkers’ 
approach in the philosophy of science is anti-metaphysical while some 
preserve the validity of metaphysics (Wallace, 1967). In a different vein, 
Burtt (1954, p. 27) says “the philosophy of science is a methodic skepticism 
about many of the traditional foundations” of the scientific enterprise. 
“Methodic scepticism” in this context means a critique, a vigorous 
philosophical analysis of scientific ideals and concepts. Mario Bunge 
proffers that the philosophy of science should more appropriately be a 
“Metascience”. He considers that the expression “philosophy of science” is 
too restrictive for the content covered in the discipline. He suggests 
“Metascience” which is broad enough to include “a Philosophy of, in, from, 
with, and for science” (Wallace, 1967, p. 1216). Some other authors 
conceive philosophy of science as a second-order enterprise. One such 
author is William Oliver Martin. He opines that because the philosophy of 
nature deals with nature and not with science, then it is about “first 
intentions”. But because the philosophy of science is concerned with “the 
philosophy of our knowledge about nature”, then it is actually a part of logic 
and as such is of the order of “second intentions” (Wallace, 1967, p. 1217). 
In yet another vein, Y. Simon conceives the philosophy of science as a 
“mélange” of elements from natural philosophy and modern science. He is of 
the view that the philosophy of science is a complex matrix lying on the 
boundary between philosophy and science. He writes: “When a philosopher 
informed of positive science or a scientist interested in philosophy considers 
philosophical problems raised by the study of positive question, the 
philosophical and the positive point of view appear successively in his 
exposition…. If there is an ascending analysis towards ontological concepts, 
the work is essentially philosophical; if there is a descending analysis toward 
definite experiences, the work is scientific. On such an understanding, the 
philosophy of science is a mélange of elements from philosophy and modern 
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science that cannot be definitely restricted to either discipline” (Wallace, 
1967, p.1217).  
From these various conceptions we can draw-forth a definition of the 
philosophy of science moreorless generally acceptable. We can educe that 
the philosophy of science is the discipline charged with the task of the 
analysis, evaluation, and synthesis of the philosophical problems associated 
with modern science. Put in other words, the philosophy of science is the 
investigation of the philosophical questions that arise from reflecting on 
science. Such philosophical problem might relate to the metaphysics of 
science, the epistemology of science, the methodology of science, or 
problems related to the end of science (its value, technology, ethics, politics 
and religion).  
 
Branches of the Philosophy of Science 
The philosophy of science could be divided into two major branches: 
“general philosophy of science and the philosophies of the individual 
sciences” (Curd & Psillos, 2014, p. xxiii). The latter is also variously referred 
to as particular, specific or applied philosophy of science. General 
philosophy of science endeavous to comprehend science as a cognitive 
enterprise, that in a special way is able to give accreditable information about 
the world. It also strives to see science as one and unified. Thus it addresses 
general and foundational problems about science. For instance, what is 
science and how does it differ from pseudoscience? We have given elaborate 
treatment of this kind of philosophy of science questions in the section under 
the formal object of the philosophy of science.  
The philosophies of the individual sciences or applied philosophy of 
science addresses more specialized problems within the individual sciences 
or particular scientific theories. This explains designations such as 
philosophy of physics, biology and economics. The development of this 
branch of the philosophy of science in the 1980s is consequent upon the shift 
in attention from the macro-structure of science to micro-structure of the 
individual sciences with its promise to address a broader range of 
philosophical questions about science.  
In a similar fashion, Horwich, (2014, p. 589) also thinks that two 
sorts of the philosophy of science is distinguishable. They are “theory-
Oriented philosophy of science” and “problem-Oriented philosophy of 
science.” Horwich explains that the theory-oriented philosophy of science 
aims at a detailed and systematic and accurate account of the scientific 
method. Problem-oriented philosophy of science, on the other hand, has to 
do with the resolution of deep puzzles and paradoxes that arise from 
reflecting upon science; such puzzles as induction, confirmation, prediction 
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and evidence. It is observable that Horwich’s two sorts of the philosophy of 
science correspond to the general philosophy of science in our first division. 
It follows that the two branches, though distinct, are not mutually 
exclusive. The views a philosopher of science holds in general philosophy of 
science should be compatible with those he holds in applied philosophy of 
science and vise versa. Perhaps the significant place occupied by 
foundational issues and consequently general philosophy of science derive 
from philosophers penchant for abstraction and universalization. But it also 
has historical support in logical empiricism. Logical empiricism, as observed 
earlier, was a predominant approach in the philosophy of science and it 
concerned itself with general and foundational problems. So the primacy of 
foundational issues and thus general philosophy of science is a vestige of 
logical empiricism.  
  
Conclusion 
The need for this paper is created by the worrisome phenomenon in 
many of our universities and polytechnics. This refers to the conflation of the 
philosophy of science with some other disciplines akin to it; such disciplines 
as the history of science, the sociology of science, or science education. The 
objective of this paper, as stated, is to delineate the scope and boundary of 
the philosophy of science; and this implies to establish the philosophy of 
science as a distinct discipline that could stand on its own and need not be 
fused with any other. The task of the paper is to establish that the philosophy 
of science has its own objects and methodology.   
This paper successfully established the objects of the philosophy of 
science. It showed that the material object is science, the scientific enterprise. 
The formal-object is philosophical approach. And the methodology is 
philosophical analyses. In this way the paper delineates the scope and 
boundary of the philosophy of science and thus establishes it as a distinct 
discipline with “… its own professional structure, departments, and journals” 
(Curd & Psillos, 2014, p. xxiii). It follows that the conflation, the fusing and 
appropriation of the philosophy of science by subjects akin to it is not only 
unnecessary but counter-productive. The task of clarifying science using the 
special analytic tool of the philosophy of science is made impossible with 
every instance of conflation.  
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